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Laura Solanko*
An empirical note on growth and convergence across
Russian regions
Abstract
This empirical note uses publicly available Goskomstat data to investigate income growth
and convergence across Russian regions. Using data for 1992-2001, we find strong sigma
divergence simultaneously with beta convergence. The results indicate that per capita
income in Russian regions may be converging towards two separate steady states. The
poorest regions seem to be converging among themselves, while growth experiences
among other regions have been highly heterogeneous.
: convergence, divergence, Russia, regions, growth
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An empirical note on growth and convergence across
Russian regions
Tiivistelmä
Tässä lyhyessä empiirisessä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan väestön rahatulojen kasvua ja
Venäjän alueiden välistä l ähentymistä eli konvergenssia. Asukasta kohden lasketun
tulotason hajonta on kasvanut selvästi samanaikaisesti vahvan beta-konvergenssin kanssa.
Tulokset viittaavat siihen, että asukasta kohden laskettu tulotaso Venäjän alueilla olisi
konvergoitumassa kahteen eri tasapainoon. Kaikkein köyhimmät alueet konvergoituvat
keskenään, kun taas muiden alueiden kasvu on paikoin ollut hyvin ripeää. Analyysi
pohjautuu julkisesti saatavilla oleviin Goskomstatin tilastoihin vuosilta 1992–2001.
	
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1  Introduction
Russia experienced enormous regional differences in growth rates during the 1990s. As an
example, while the total gross regional product (GRP) grew 6 % in 2001, growth was by
no means evenly distributed across regions. In 17 regions, GRP increased more than 10 %,
while in eight regions GRP actually decreased. Although this phenomenon is nowadays
widely recognised, surprisingly little is known about exactly what kind of regions are
growing fast and what may explain the strong divergence trends. This paper describes
some trends in convergence and divergence across Russian regions using publicly
available Goskomstat data for 1992-2001.
There are a few recent papers analysing growth and convergence in Russian regions.
Berkowitz and DeJong (2003) look at the determinants of economic growth for a sample of
48 out of the 89 regions over the period from 1993 to 1997. Their interest is in determining
whether regional policy reform matters for economic growth, and indeed they find a
positive correspondence between price liberalization and growth in per capita incomes.
Ahrend (2002) studies regional growth for a panel of 77 regions for a somewhat longer
period. He finds that economic reform and general reform orientation explain little of the
observed differences in regional growth rates, and concludes that a region’s initial
industrial structure and resource endowment seem to have a large impact on its growth
prospects. Dolinskaja (2002) derives a similar conclusion when she analyses regional
convergence in real incomes using the transition matrix approach. Her findings confirm
that initial industrial structure and natural resources are significant in explaining regional
differences in growth rates.
None of these papers, however, covers the period after 1998. Further, to my
knowledge there is no paper attempting to apply the very basic notions of neoclassical
growth models, namely conditional and unconditional convergence, to Russian regional
data. This paper contributes to the literature by extending the sample studied to 2001, i.e.
covering the post-crisis period. Also, we apply some simple empirical tests of neoclassical
growth models to Russian regional data. Results indicate that per capita income in Russian
regions may be converging towards two separate steady states. The poorest regions appear
to be converging among themselves, while other regions continue to grow fairly rapidly.
The following section briefly discusses the data and its limitations. Section three
focuses on general trends in convergence and section four provides the results from simple
growth regressions. The last section concludes the paper.
2  Data description
While regional data tends to be problematic everywhere, Russian regional data is regarded
as dubious at best. In many instances it is even unclear exactly how regional data on
production, incomes and prices is collected and what the precise relationship is between
regional and national figures −  which rarely ever add up to the same totals.
1  Data on
nominal incomes is based on expenditure data derived from monthly household surveys
supplemented with information on e.g. retail sales. As the validity of income data is
                                                
1 Goskomstat reports that in 2001 national GDP grew 5 %. The average reported GRP was 6 %.Laura Solanko An empirical note on growth and convergence
across Russian regions
8
undermined by ad hoc estimations, figures on industrial production suffer from problems
in registering the actual location of production.
These problems notwithstanding, Goskomstat is our only feasible data source here. In
theory, the data collected and published by regional statistical offices () may more
accurately reflect local conditions, but gathering the data from 89 different administrative
subjects is clearly out of question. Moreover, even if Goskomstat data are imperfect, one
can at least assume the same mistakes are made consistently. The possible inaccuracies in
Goskomstat data thus do not preclude comparison of the Russian regions with each other.
Ideally, one would like to use GRP as the indicator of regional real income level in
any analysis of regional income distribution dynamics. Unfortunately, consistent time
series exist only for the periods 1995-2000 and 1998-2001. The latter dataset became
available in late April 2003 after Goskomstat revised its GDP and GRP figures to make
them more compatible with international standards. Consequently, relying on GRP figures
would unnecessarily shorten the time period of the analyses. A further complication with
the GRP data is that Goskomstat does not publish regional GRP deflators.
2
Fortunately, it turns out that the indicators “monetary incomes per capita” and the
“value of industrial production” both closely correlate with GRP, and both indicators are
readily available from 1990 onwards. The average annual correlation coefficients with
GRP for the full sample of 89 regions are reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Correlation between GRP and monetary incomes and industrial production








Regional consumer and producer price indices for 1992-2001 are also readily available,
which greatly facilitates growth analysis. There is no self-evident decision rule for
determining which of the two indicators is better in analysing convergence. Both have been
used in earlier studies on regional growth. Yudaeva et al (2001) and Ahrend (2002) use
both indicators, whereas e.g. Berkowitz and DeJong (2003), Dolinskaya (2002) and
Carluer-Sharipova (2001) use monetary incomes. Here, we have chosen the “income per
capita” indicator, mainly because relying on industrial production makes agricultural
regions and the regions where service sector has any significance look unfairly poor.




publications. Figures are available for most regions (excluding Chechnya) for 1990 – 2001.
Data for autonomous okrugs (AOs) is reported only from 1997 onwards.
3 The nominal
figures are deflated by regional consumer price index to arrive at real incomes measured in
2000 roubles. We start with the assumption that the price level in 1992 was equal in all
                                                
2 Even if the deflators were available, the accuracy of GRP data is probably weaker than that of its
components (Granberg-Zaitseva 2002).
3 Chukotka (Chukchi) AO and Jewish (Yevreyskaya) AO are reported starting from 1993. The Adygeya
Republic, Karachai-Cherkessia Republic, Altai Republic and Khakassia Republic are reported from 1991.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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regions as there is no consistent way to control for differences in overall price levels. Later,
we relax this assumption.
As Goskomstat reports regional CPI only from 1992 onwards, real monetary income
for 1990-1991 becomes unavailable. This certainly is not a dramatic loss of data as the
reliability of the data on very early 1990’s is extremely unreliable due to the enormous
economic changes. CPI is missing for Ingushetia in 1992 and for Komi-Permyak AO for
the entire period (i.e. for 1997-2000). The table below shows number of observations,
standard deviation, median and mean of real per capita income measured in 2000 roubles
for each year in the sample. The mean real income per capita is 1821.8 and the standard
deviation is 1357.6 over the whole period.
Table 2. Real monetary incomes per capita, per month, in 2000 roubles
Year N Median Mean Standard
 deviation
Skewness Kurtosis Real national
income
4
1992 76 881.1765 1025.738 533.9026 2.6 10.1
1993 79 1107.692 1303.127 904.0181 4.7 29.7
1994 79 1472.254 1798.161 1264.457 4.2 22.5
1995 79 1470.478 1827.166 1188.835 3.9 21.9 100
1996 79 1759.946 2175.561 1456.075 4.5 28.6 101.3
1997 87 1986.383 2509.799 1790.905 3.6 18.9 108.2
1998 87 1176.371 1519.937 1060.938 3.0 14.1   91.8
1999 87 1365.438 1707.152 1174.743 3.3 16.4  79.9
2000 87 1478 1911.195 1375.722 3.2 15.1   91.1
2001 87 1787.752 2322.852 1637.874 2.8 11.4 100.7
1992-2001 828 1455 1821.8 1357.6 3.7 21.6
Mean real income is considerably higher than median, confirming the general view that a
handful of regions are very rich. High positive values of skewness further confirm that the
distribution of incomes across regions is asymmetric. The tail of high values is longer than
the tail of low values. The same picture is given by the kurtosis measure: long, thin tails
characterise the distribution of income across regions.
Interestingly, the skewness and kurtosis of the income distribution increase up to 1996
then decrease gradually thereafter. The available data suggest that the distribution in 2001
was as asymmetric as it was in 1992. Compared to the mid-1990s, the distribution’s tails
have shortened; in particular, the tail of high values has become shorter again. The crisis
year 1998 seems to cause no significant impact on these indicators. However, apart from
1998, the standard deviation (sd) of incomes increases constantly, suggesting that the
distribution has become more dispersed.
Table 2 readily suggests that the mean of regional real income figures tell a brighter
story of real income developments than the national figures. This is probably due to the
fact that the national figures use population weights. This should mean that several of the
high-income regions have small populations. Apart from the capital city, this seems indeed
to be the case. There are five regions with mean real incomes for 1992-2000 above 4000
roubles (The City of Moscow, Tyumen, Khanty-Mansi AO, Yamalo-Nenets AO and
Chukotka). High (above 3000 roubles) mean real incomes are also reported for Nenets AO,
Murmansk, Taymyr AO, Kamchatka, Koryak AO, Magadan and Sakha (Yakutia). Of all
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the above-mentioned regions, only The City of Moscow and Tyumen have populations
over 1.5 million. All the others are small regions in the Russian North, which is well
known for natural resource wealth and relatively high price and wage levels.
Not surprisingly, The City of Moscow, Khanty-Mansi AO, Yamalo-Nenet AO and
Chukotka also account for much of the variation (standard deviation) in real incomes.
Excluding these regions from the sample reduces the overall standard deviation of real
incomes to 801 and the sample mean over the whole period to 1631.5 roubles. These four
regions clearly are the potential outliers in the analyses. As the Tyumen region includes
both AO’s, it may be wise to include the parent region into the list of potential outliers at
some point.
These four regions are also jurisdictions with relatively high price levels, making it
tempting to use the monetary incomes adjusted by a price level indicator as the income
measure. Unfortunately, data limitations prohibit us from doing this, because Goskomstat
offers no consistent measure of regional price level over the entire period. The price of a
basket of 19 basic goods is reported for 1992-1994, the price of a 24-goods basket for
1994-1997, the regional minimum subsistence level for 1996-1999 and finally the price for
a minimum food basket from 2000 onwards.
3  Concepts of convergence
A key property of the neoclassical growth models is convergence. Most models predict that
the further below its steady state an economy starts out, the faster it tends to grow.
Assuming similar tastes and technologies, economies’ steady states are similar, i.e. poor
economies tend to grow faster than rich ones. This is referred to as absolute, or
unconditional, convergence. Many empirical studies have proved that absolute
convergence does not apply for a broad cross-selection of countries. For a relatively
homogenous group of countries or regions, like the OECD or the states of the US, absolute
convergence has been established.
5
3.1  Sigma convergence
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) define sigma (σ ) convergence as a measure of the level of
income dispersion. Sigma convergence occurs if the dispersion in income declines over
time. This dispersion can, for example, be measured by the standard deviation – hence the
name – of per capita income across regions or countries. The figure below shows the
standard deviation (i.e. sigma convergence) of real incomes from 1992 to 2001 for the full
sample of 79/87 regions (sigma_all) and for the sample excluding The City of Moscow,
Khanty-Mansi AO, Yamalo-Nenets AO and Chukotka (sigma*).
                                                
5 For more discussion on growth and convergence see Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or de la Fuente (2000).Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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Figure 1.  Sigma convergence across Russian regions 1992-2001
There are three immediate lessons to be derived from the data. First, there does not seem to
be any evidence of sigma convergence. On the contrary, income dispersion increased by
more than three times between 1992 and 2001. Second, the crisis of 1998 caused only a
temporary decrease in income dispersion. The variation in incomes started to grow
immediately after the crisis. By 2001, the level of dispersion was about the same as in
1997. The third observation is that – as expected – removing the four richest regions from
the sample significantly reduces the variance in real incomes but does not change the
general trend of divergence.
3.2  Unconditional beta convergence
Beta (β ) convergence measures the speed of convergence. Beta convergence applies if a
poor country or region tends to grow faster than a rich one. Beta convergence implies that,
over a long time period, the per capita income level of a poor region will tend to catch up
with the level of a rich region. Unconditional beta convergence refers to countries or
regions converging to a common steady state, whereas conditional beta convergence
implies conditional convergence. There is no universal way of measuring beta convergence
as the exact formulation depends on the assumptions of the underlying growth model used.
Loosely speaking, however, unconditional beta convergence is said to exist if the income
level in the base year is negatively correlated with annual average growth rate over the
observed period.
In our case, the simplest measure of unconditional beta convergence is the simple
correlation between 1992 income level and the average annual income growth rate in
1993-2001. Defined this way, the simple measure of unconditional beta convergence is –
0.2 for the 76 regions for which there is data over the entire period 1992-2001. Excluding
The City of Moscow from the sample increases the absolute value of correlation to –0.4.
This cross-sectional correlation would seem to indicate that beta convergence exists.
Regions with initially low-income levels appear, on average, to have had faster growth
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Assuming for the moment that all Russian regions have a common steady state
6, beta
convergence may be estimated by a simple regression 	ε  where
lngrowth is average annual growth rate over the entire period, lny92 is the initial level of
income and ε  is the error term. If  is negative and significantly different from zero,
absolute convergence is said to hold. Estimating the simple log-linear model by OLS gives
the results in Table 3 below.
Table 3. Unconditional beta convergence
regress lngrowth lny92
lngrowth        Coef. Std. Err.       t
Number of obs =      76
lny92     -.029933 .0081619    -3.67
_cons       .275564 .0559493     4.93 Adj R-squared =  0.1424
The coefficient for initial level of per capita income (lny92) has the expected sign and is
statistically highly significant. The estimated magnitude of beta convergence is 0.03, which
indicates annual convergence at the rate of 3 %.
7 This is broadly in line with the magnitude
of beta convergence found in many cross-country and regional studies.
Figure 2. Unconditional beta convergence across Russian regions
These results would seem to indicate that, even though dispersion of incomes has increased
on average, the incomes in the initially richer regions have not grown as fast (or contracted
as much) as in the poorer regions. This somewhat surprising result comes with a number of
caveats. The major one is rather trivial: Russian regions are unlikely to have one steady
                                                
6 Studies focusing on regional convergence in e.g. the US, Spain, Japan and EU usually assume that all
regions within the same country have a common steady state. This certainly is a more realistic assumption
than expecting all countries in the world to have a common steady state; regions often share similar culture,
central administration, law enforcement, language etc. Homogeneity of Russian regions, of course, remains
an open issue.
7 Dropping Moscow City from the regression slightly improves the fit. With 75 observations OLS gives a =
0.33, b =  -0.38 and R-squared = 0.26. The b-coefficient remains statistically highly significant.
lny92
 ln(y01/y92)/10  Fitted values
6.15852 8.08641
-.005686
.126813Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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state common to all. Thus, the regression above is likely to be erroneous due to
misspecification and thus needs to be redefined before the results can be interpreted. It is
also possible that simple OLS, which is fairly sensitive to outlying observations, does not
provide robust estimates. The second caveat is more fundamental and potentially
tantalising. As already discussed, all of the above analyses assume that the initial price
level was identical in all regions at the beginning of the period (i.e. 1992). However, it is
well known that prices and wages were significantly higher in the North even in the Soviet
era and that price liberalization further increased the relative living costs in very remote
areas. If we use the number of 19-goods baskets an average monthly income could buy in
1992 (yreal92) as the explanatory variable, the simple correlation and regression analysis
gives a completely different picture.
The table below describes the simple correlation between the variables: y is the real
income level, avegrowth is average annual growth rate of y and yreal92 is the income level
in 1992 divided by the price of the 19- basic goods basket. The prefix ln indicates the same
variables in logarithmic form.
Table 4. Simple correlation
(obs=74
8)
avegrowth lngrowth y92 lny92 yreal92
avegrowth 1.0000
lngrowth 0.9693 1.0000
y92                   -0.2922 -0.3411 1.0000
lny92                -0.3336 -0.3711 0.9574 1.0000
yreal92 0.0464  0.0581 0.4744 0.5123 1.0000
lnyreal92 0.0299  0.0433 0.4676 0.5334 0.9660
On average, it appears growth of per capita real incomes is significantly and negatively
related to initial level of monetary income, but positively, if not strongly, related to the
measure of initial real monetary income level. Any OLS regressing growth on y92 is likely
to produce a negative coefficient, while regressing growth on yreal92 is likely to produce a
positive coefficient pointing towards divergence. This suggests that regions with initially
high price levels grew slower than other regions. While this issue requires more careful
analyses, it raises the possibility that at least two groups of regions exist, i.e. a poor group
and another “rich” group.
In a recent paper, Andrienko and Guriev (2003) suggest that the poorest third of the
Russian regions are trapped in poverty in the sense that people would move away if only
they could afford it. Elsewhere in the Russian Federation, the well-known Tiebout
hypothesis of people voting with their feet seems to have some validity. To test if the
growth experience of the poorest third differs from the majority of the regions, the sample
was split in two using a dummy for the poorest regions. Dummy poor92 = 1 if yreal92 was
less than the 30
th percentile.
The table below seems to suggest that the two groups differ. For the poor regions,
average income growth is negatively related to both the income level in 1992 and the
income level adjusted by the price level indicator in 1992. For the other regions, y92 is
                                                
8 Leningrad region is excluded due to missing data on the price of the 19-goods basket.Laura Solanko An empirical note on growth and convergence
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negatively, and yreal92 positively, correlated with average annual growth. Thus, it could
well be that the poorer regions are converging among themselves, while the rest are not.
Table 5.  Correlation for poor group
poor92 = 0 (obs = 53)
avegrowth      y92   yreal92
avegrowth     1.0000
y92    -0.1185    1.0000
yreal92     0.1410       0.5317    1.0000
______________________________________________________________________________
poor92 = 1 (obs = 21)
avegrowth      y92   yreal92
avegrowth     1.0000
y92    -0.6153    1.0000
yreal92              -0.0819    0.2526    1.0000
The average annual growth in the poor group has indeed been higher than in the rest of the
sample. The difference is confirmed by a basic t-test, which rejects the null hypothesis on
the equality of the means. The standard deviations of annual real income levels (rmipc) the
poor group are significantly lower than those of the rest of the Russian regions. Figure 3
depicts sigma convergence for the two groups separately. For the sake of comparison, the
sigma convergence of the full sample excluding the four outliers (sigma*) is included.
Figure 3.  Sigma convergence of poor and rich groups
The figure confirms that the poor regions have neither diverged nor converged (at least, in
a sigma-convergence sense). The differences in the income levels between the regions that
were the poorest in 1992 have not changed markedly over the ten-year period. The rich
group, on the other hand, seems to be considerably more heterogeneous. Among the
initially rich regions income dispersion has increased dramatically.
What characterises a poor region? Have the initially poor regions really improved
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4  Conditional convergence and growth
4.1  Ranking regions by per capita income
We begin our analysis by ranking all regions by their incomes per capita in 1992-2001.
The first observation from comparing the rankings in 1992 with the rankings in 2001 is
that the relative position of practically taken all regions has changed remarkably. The
position of 54 regions (out of the 76 in the sample) had changed more than 5 ranks (i.e.
dropped or increased more than 5 ranks). The regions whose relative position between
1992 and 2001 has deteriorated most are a heterogeneous group including Kalmykia,
Chita, Kurgan, Mordva and Orenburg. The regions whose relative position has increased
most include Moscow oblast (which has largely benefited from the growth in The City of
Moscow), the independence-minded republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan and a
handful of “traditional” regions of European Russia: Smolensk, Vologda, St. Petersburg,
Astrakhan, Perm and Voronezh.
A standard rank correlation coefficient, Spearman’s rho, measures if any two given
rankings are independent of another. The correlation coefficient between a region’s rank in
2001 and a region’s rank in any other year is very high leading to rejection of the null
hypothesis that the rankings are random and independent of each other. A region’s position
in the income ranking in 2001 is dependent on its relative position in previous years.
However, the rank correlation between years 1992 and 2001 is significantly lower than
between any year after 1992 and 2001.
As the table below shows, there is a clear difference between the two groups in how
the income level rankings develop. For the poor regions (which had real incomes in the
lowest third in 1992), rank correlation with the income ranking in 2001 is close to one
from 1993 onwards. For other regions, the value of Spearman’s rho increases, as one
would expect, each year. This observation suggests that the relative position of those
initially poor has not changed significantly since 1993. It is thus possible that choosing the
first reform year 1992 as the base year gives an incorrect picture of actual changes.
Table 6. The values of Spearman’s rho




1 % critical value in
two-tailed test
rank_y92 0.5588 0.5935 0.5346 0.405
rank_y93 0.7776 0.9104 0.6903 0.405
rank_y94 0.8230 0.9026 0.7587 0.405
rank_y95 0.8811 0.9299 0.8558 0.405
rank_y96 0.9066 0.9169 0.8895 0.405
rank_y97 0.9545 0.9377 0.9319 0.405
rank_y98 0.9701 0.9805 0.9532 0.405
rank_y99 0.9748 0.9636 0.9668 0.405
rank_y00 0.9723 0.9558 0.9652 0.405Laura Solanko An empirical note on growth and convergence
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4.2  Possible determinants of conditional convergence
The examination of sigma convergence in the previous section confirms that, apart from
1998, differences in income levels between Russian regions have grown during the past ten
years. The existence of beta convergence seems to suggest that poorer regions have grown
faster. Increasing dispersion of incomes together with beta convergence implies that the
initial value of σ  is below its steady-state value. As mentioned above, it is, however,
questionable if all of Russia’s 89 regions share a common steady-state level of per capita
income.
Common language, culture, values and socialist history notwithstanding, the economic
environments in Russian regions differ significantly from each other. First, the tinier
regions are often wholly dependent on a handful of large enterprises. Thus, a major change
at a large plant can alter annual industrial production, incomes and tax revenues
significantly. Indeed, this is one of the reasons for large annual variation in regional growth
rates. Second, much of Russia’s wealth is concentrated in natural resources, which are
unevenly distributed across the federation. Therefore, it would be rather surprising to find
that all Russian regions would have a common steady state.
If regions do not converge to a common steady state, then the estimations on absolute
convergence are misspecified. If the real steady state is correlated with the initial income
level, then the error term is, in fact, correlated with the explanatory variable. This leads to
downward-biased estimates. One widely used remedy is to use a multivariate regression,
including some constant proxies for the steady states such as geography and sectoral
composition of output.  Further, the cross-sectional dispersion of incomes is naturally
sensitive to aggregate shocks that affect certain regional subgroups. To the extent these
shocks tend to affect poor and rich regions differently (i.e. shocks correlate with the
explanatory variable), their omission from a regression usually leads to biased estimates of
beta. Controlling for possible aggregate shocks and differences in steady states (i.e.
differences in the economy’s production function) gives estimates of “conditional” beta-
convergence.
What are the likely determinants of regional steady states? A first guess might be that
geography matters for the steady state. If possible shocks always affect different parts of
the country differently, adding regional dummies to the regression should improve the fit.
Shocks that affect different sectors of the economy differently may also cause divergence
across regions. A measure of the economic structure of each region may thus help explain
some of the variation in incomes. Further, depending on whether one has a neoclassical or
endogenous growth model in mind, proxies on investment in physical and human capital
may be significant. Finally, regional economic policy may matter for growth and
convergence.
Geography has been a significant regressor in several cross-sectional growth studies.
In the case of the US, main state census regions have been used as the geography proxy. In
China’s case, it has become almost standard to impose a dummy for coastal regions.
9
Whether geography matters is probably more of an open question in Russia than in many
countries. At least two groupings could be used: administrative division into the federal
districts and distance from Moscow. Distance from the capital may sound like a strange
explanatory variable in a growth regression, but if we take into account the overly
centralized nature of Soviet economy with all roads leading to Moscow, it could well yield
interesting results. The variable dist measures the distance in kilometres from regional
capital to the City of Moscow.
                                                
9 See Demurger et al (2002) for China and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for the US and Japan.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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In the case of Russian regions, there are strong reasons to suppose that a region’s initial
economic structure matters considerably for growth. Economic structures inherited from
Soviet times did not necessarily have much to do with economic efficiency or productivity.
Regions typically specialised in production within a few industrial branches, which made
them extremely vulnerable to the dramatic price changes in early transition. As noted
above, regions with substantial natural resources in oil, natural gas or metals received huge
comparative advantage immediately when foreign trade was liberalised. As no satisfactory
federation-wide measure of natural resource endowments is available, one needs to find
some indirect proxy for it.
All in all, when it comes to the economic structure of a region, we must work with
extremely incomplete data. In the ideal case, we would have the relative shares of all basic
economic sectors in average regional per capita income over the whole period. The best
available proxies are the relative shares of manufacturing and extracting industries in
region’s industrial output in 1995 (man95 and ext95) as well as the number of people
employed in agriculture in 1995 (agri95).
Manufacturing industries here include machinery, light industries and construction of
building materials. Extractive industries are composed of ferrous and nonferrous
metallurgy and energy & fuel (oil, gas, coal) production. This is roughly the same
classification as the one used by Dolinskaya (2002). The share of processing industries is
the closest available proxy for the valuable natural resources. Intuitively, one would expect
that regions with relatively higher shares of manufacturing fared worse during the 1990s
compared with regions where the share of processing industries is higher. Although the
data are for 1995, we can fairly safely take them to represent the inherited industrial
structure at the outset of transition. The level and value of industrial production may have
changed dramatically in the early 1990s, but regional economic structures have been
remarkably stable.
Regional figures on investments in Russia are generally considered highly unreliable.
Yet even accurate figures would not produce an especially good explanatory variable as
most fixed investments go to the oil and gas sectors. There is also some uncertainty as to
whether investments drive economic growth or vice versa.
10 The same considerations also
apply to foreign direct investment. On the other hand, the data on education is supposedly
fairly accurate and several possible explanatory variables are available. We use the number
of students graduating from higher education establishments (aveedu) to proxy investment
in human capital.
Whether economic policies of Russian regions have, in fact, affected regional growth
dynamics is hotly debated. On the one hand, the period we focus on is rather short for any
impacts from economic policy to show up. The 1990s were generally turbulent time and
hardly amenable to long-term planning. On the other hand, regional policies and practices
differ considerably across Russian regions. One of the generally accepted results of the
voluminous literature that emerged in the 1990s on determinants of cross-country growth is
that institutions matter. Corruption and good governance, as well as measures of good
economic policies, have proven to be significant not just in transition countries, but across
a wide selection of countries.
11
Due to the lack of any consistent data on regional economic policies or business
climate in Russia, this issue must remain open for the time being. We, however, attempt to
proxy regional policies. One readily available proxy on region’s general reform orientation
                                                
10 Barro (1997), for example, finds that growth spurs investments.
11 See e.g. Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (2000) on transition countries.Laura Solanko An empirical note on growth and convergence
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is provided by population’s voting behaviour in federal elections. Unfortunately, the share
of votes given for reform-minded parties or candidates has proven to be completely
insignificant in almost all existing studies on Russian regions. There exist various rankings
of the regions that could probably be used in proxying regional policies and attitudes. None
of them, however, has the advantage of covering all regions. To cite an example,
Transparency International published in conjunction with Russian IMDEP a corruption
ranking of Russian regions in 2002. Unfortunately, this ranking covers only a small part of
the regions.
Consequently, one is tempted to stick to Goskomstat data in the search for a measure
of regional economic policies. The one most often used is the number of small and
medium-sized enterprises (i.e. firms employing fewer than 250 persons). The number of
SMEs is roughly equivalent to number of new businesses. New business formation can be
taken as an important outcome of market-friendly or growth-promoting policies. Thus, we
use the number of registered SMEs (avesme) to proxy regional policies and business
environments.
4.3  Simple growth regressions
Following the tradition in growth literature, the dependent variable is average annual
growth in income. To measure beta convergence, the initial level of income (lny92) is
included as the first explanatory variable and followed by the proxies for different steady
states. The regions differ considerably (for example, with regard to per capita incomes and
the share of agriculture), as is apparent in Table 7.
Table 7. Descriptive statistics for the regional cross-section
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lngrowth 76 .0707083 .02999 -.0056863 .1617462
ext95 76 20.83553 20.89522 .2 80.4
dist89 76 2211.895 2612.468 0 11876
lny92 76 6.8438 .3929209 6.158518 8.086411
aveedu 76 6047.304 10717.56 100.75 87064.55
avesme 76 833.7487 2110.282 17.9 18138.6
agri95 76 103.3408 82.95736 7.3 456.7
We first run a simple OLS on the full sample. The immediate finding is that, when
supplemented with other variables, initial income becomes more significant in explaining
growth. Also, its absolute size increases.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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Table 8. First OLS on average annual growth rate
lngrowth        Coef.    Std. Err.       t     P>t      Number of obs =      76
lny92    -.0515132     .0085302     -6.04    0.000 R-squared =     0.5642
ext95      .0005084     .0001259      4.04    0.000      F(  6,    69) =   14.89
dist89                5.04e-07    1.17e-06       0.43    0.668
aveedu     1.37e-06    8.57e-07      1.59    0.115
avesme     1.98e-06    4.40e-06       0.45    0.655
agri95   -.0000369     .0000305     -1.21    0.230
_cons                  .4054532      .056556       7.17    0.000      
The second surprising observation is that variables on education and new business
formation are strongly positively correlated. Jointly, they are statistically insignificant;
once one is dropped from the regression, the other immediately becomes significant.
Although they are positively correlated, we dare not argue that a higher level of education
causes new business formation or the converse. The close correlation is probably due to the
fact that the majority of universities are concentrated in rich regions with big regional
capitals (e.g. the City of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sverdlovsk) where there is a sufficient
demand base for services. Most new enterprises operate in the service sector.
Several of the explanatory variables in the initial model turned out to be insignificant,
and thus dropping the insignificant ones could actually improve the fit. I dropped one
explanatory variable at the time starting from the education variable. Once  was
removed, new business formation () became highly significant. Other explanatory
variables that were initially insignificant stayed so. Dropping 
,  and 	
 one
at the time from the regression produces the results reported in Table 9.
Table 9. Second OLS
lngrowth Coef. Std. Error t-stat Signif Number of obs =      76
lny92 -.0481504 .0067224 -7.16 0.000
ext95  .0004948 .0001242  3.98 0.000
avesme  8.40e-06  1.17e-06  7.18 0.000
_cons  .3829269 .0449398  8.52 0.000 Adj R-squared =  0.5205
The coefficient on initial income () remains significant and negative suggesting
surprisingly strong beta convergence at the rate of 5 %. The coefficients on the share of
extractive industries and the number of SMEs remain highly significant and have the
expected signs. The values of these coefficients, however, are extremely small. All other
potential explanatory variables turn out to be insignificant.
What about initially poor regions vis-à-vis all other regions? As expected, the share of
extractive industries in total industrial production () is much lower and the number of
people employed in agriculture (	
) is much higher in the initially poor regions. Apart
from the increased significance of  for the poor, the regression results change little
much even when the sample is split in two (see Appendix A). Also as expected, when
using the level of income adjusted by the price level indicator in 1992 () as the
initial level of income, the results change. The explanatory variables that turn out toLaura Solanko An empirical note on growth and convergence
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significant in this regression are the share of extractive industries and the number of SMEs
together with distance from Moscow (see Appendix B).
What happens if we drop the City of Moscow? The other potential outliers identified
in the section 2 (Khanty-Mansi AO, Yamalo-Nenets AO and Chukotka) are not included in
the regressions due to missing data for 1992. Without the City of Moscow the variable
measuring the share of agriculture becomes significant. The negative coefficient on the
variable 	
 indicates that agricultural regions have experienced slower growth (see
Appendix C). The fact that the results change substantially when only one potential outlier
is removed from the sample should not come as a surprise. OLS is extremely sensitive for
outlier observations.
A far more robust estimation technique is provided by least trimmed squares (LTS)
estimator of Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987). LTS defines outliers as those with standardised
LTS residuals exceeding 2.5. The results from the initial LTS regression appear in
Appendix D. Dropping the insignificant variables one at the time results in the robust
estimators below. Altogether four regions had standardised residuals exceeding 2.5: The
City of Moscow (-21.15821), Komi (3.13878), Tyumen (2.73797) and Magadan (2.64999),
and consequently those observations are excluded from the regression reported in Table
10.
Table 10. Linear regression based on LTS
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares
Dependent Variable lngrowth
Usable Observations     72      Degrees of Freedom    67
Total Observations     76       Skipped/Missing        4
Centered R**2     0.600186       R Bar **2   0.576316
Uncentered R**2   0.944197      T x R**2      67.982
Mean of Dependent Variable      0.0689516472
Std Error of Dependent Variable 0.0279655987
Standard Error of Estimate       0.0182030851
Sum of Squared Residuals         0.0222006045
Regression F(4,67)                    25.1445
Significance Level of F            0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic             1.838688
 Variable                      Coeff        Std Error       T-Stat      Signif
*******************************************************************************
1.  Constant                          0.4435        0.0459       9.65916   0.00000000
2.  lny92                            -0.0571    6.7502e-03       -8.45175   0.00000000
3.  agri95                         -7.3417e-05    3.1018e-05       -2.36692   0.02083376
4.  avesme                           2.0063e-05    3.8412e-06        5.22308   0.00000187
5.  ext95                           4.5569e-04    1.1726e-04        3.88620   0.00023604
The results do not differ dramatically from the ones derived from standard OLS imposed
on the sample excluding the City of Moscow alone. All significant explanatory variables
have the expected signs. The coefficient on initial income is negative, pointing towards
fairly strong beta convergence. The share of workers employed in agriculture has a clear
negative effect on average growth rate, whereas the education variable and the measure of
the share of extracting industries have a significant positive effect on growth. The most
widely used goodness-of-fit measure, R squared, is 0.58 indicating that close to 60 % of
the variation in growth can is explained by the estimated model. Given the data limitations,
this can be considered to be a satisfactory level of explanatory power.Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition BOFIT Discussion Papers 9/2003
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5  Conclusions and directions for further research
This paper used publicly available Goskomstat data on Russian regions to analyse regional
growth and convergence between 1992− 2001. A number of interesting phenomena were
identified. First, as expected, income dispersion across Russian regions constantly
increased over the observed period. This general picture, of course, does not tell the entire
truth. When the sample was split into two, based on the level of real monetary income in
1992, it was found that among the poorest one-third of the regions income dispersion has
not increased nor decreased. Differences in incomes widened first and foremost among the
rest of the regions, i.e. among the group that were initially better off. Thus, we found
evidence of club convergence.
The measure of the speed of convergence, i.e. beta convergence, points towards
surprisingly strong convergence across regions. Estimated magnitudes of unconditional
and conditional beta convergence were 3 % and 6 %, respectively. In addition to the initial
income level, a number of other explanatory variables were found significant in explaining
cross-sectional growth. In conformity with the empirical growth literature, levels of
education and the share of agriculture were found significant with the expected signs in
explaining growth across Russian regions. As expected, the share of extractive industries in
total industrial production of a region was found to have a strong positive effect on growth
rates. This is clearly in line with much of the transition literature arguing that the initial
conditions, especially the initial industrial structure, matters for growth. In circumstances
of Russia the share of extracting industries can also be interpreted as a proxy for natural
resources as most of what was classified as extracting industries is mining together with
oil, gas and fuel production. Finally, new business formation, proxied by the number of
small and medium-sized businesses, had a robust, positive effect on growth.
Most studies of growth and convergence rely on much longer time-series than
transition countries presently offer. Consequently, it has become standard in the literature
to report not only estimates over the whole sample but also pooled data over shorter sub-
periods, imposing a constant value of b while allowing for fixed time effects. As the 1998
crisis caused a clear break in growth and convergence in Russia, a follow-up paper might
find it advantageous to split the data into the sub-periods 1992-1998 and 1999-2001.
Differences in real income levels widened during the 1990s, but the crisis years 1998-
1999 narrowed the gap between rich and poor regions. Further research might also
consider the following questions. Was this narrowing related to e.g. exporting regions
facing temporary downturns? Have rural regions fared any better after the crisis? Was the
convergence only a temporary phenomenon or did the August 1998 crisis result in some
kind of a structural break?
Panel data approach has not been very widely used in growth analyses. However,
results from such analyses have been radically different from the classical ones using
single cross-section regressions. Those results have provoked many debates questioning
both the validity of classical growth theories and the statistical methods used. Some
researchers argue that the higher convergence rates found in panel data studies are at least
partially explained by the fact that some estimates fail to separate between short-term
fluctuations around a time trend and long-term growth (de la Fuente 2000). In the follow-
up paper, we definitely plan to complement the cross-sectional regressions with basic panel
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. by poor, sort: regress  lngrowth lny92 ext95 avesme
poor92 = 0
Source        SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      54
Total   .048095238    53  .000907457 Adj R-squared =  0.4841
lngrowth        Coef.    Std. Err.       t     P>t     [95% Conf. Interval]
lny92    -.0415839    .0087663    -4.74    0.000        -.0591915      -
.0239763
ext95     .0004792    .0001384     3.46    0.001          .0002011
.0007572
avesme     7.89e-06    1.25e-06     6.31    0.000          5.38e-06
.0000104
_cons     .3373265    .0592774     5.69    0.000          .2182644
.4563886
poor92 = 1
Source        SS       df       MS               Number of obs =      21
Total   .018692313    20  .000934616  Adj R-squared =  0.6956
lngrowth        Coef.    Std. Err.       t     P>t     [95% Conf. Interval]
lny92    -.0654595    .0103475     -6.33    0.000        -.0872907      -
.0436282
ext95     .0011791    .0004902      2.41    0.028          .0001449
.0022133
avesme     .0000225    .43e-06      4.15    0.001          .0000111
.000034
_cons     .4869207      .06651      7.32    0.000          .3465969
.6272445
Appendix B
regress lngrowth lnyreal92 ext95 avesme dist89
lngrowth       Coef. Std. Err.        t Number of obs =      74
lnyreal92   -.0042772 .0126561     -0.34
ext95          .0002729 .0001638      1.67
avesme        5.70e-06 1.43e-06      3.98
dist89         -3.42e-06 1.17e-06     -2.92




. drop if region=="MOS"
(14 observations deleted)
regress  lngrowth lny92 ext95 agri95  avesme
Number of obs =      75  Adj R-squared =  0.5066
lngrowth       Coef.    Std. Err.       t P>t
lny92    -.0501778    .0067385     -7.45 0.000
ext95      .0005036    .0001207       4.17 0.000
agri95    -.0000787    .0000335     -2.35 0.022
avesme      .0000197    4.19e-06       4.70 0.000
_cons       .398175            .0459726       8.66 0.000
Appendix D
In this estimation, three outliers are skipped: The City of Moscow (-9.59129),
Tyumen (2.75431) and Komi republic (2.94355). LTS residuals are in
parenthesis.
Linear Regression - Estimation by Least Squares
Dependent Variable lngrowth
Usable Observations     73         Degrees of Freedom    66
Total Observations     76          Skipped/Missing        3
Centered R**2     0.588645            R Bar **2   0.551249
Uncentered R**2   0.942537         T x R**2      68.805
Mean of Dependent Variable         0.0686809466
Std Error of Dependent Variable   0.0278668606
Standard Error of Estimate          0.0186676965
Sum of Squared Residuals            0.0229998710
Regression F(6,66)                       15.7409
Significance Level of F               0.00000000
Durbin-Watson Statistic                1.801555
Variable                      Coeff        Std Error       T-Stat      Signif
**************************************************************************
1.  Constant               0.4540        0.0551       8.24457   0.00000000
2.  lny92                         -0.0589    8.2872e-03     -7.11064   0.00000000
3.  agri95                        -7.1141e-05    3.2423e-05     -2.19415   0.03175025
4.  aveedu                       3.4076e-07    9.0731e-07       0.37557   0.70844046
5.  avesme                      1.7926e-05    7.8519e-06       2.28299   0.02565898
6.  dist                         1.4630e-06    1.1037e-06       1.32547   0.18958411
7.  ext95                         4.0102e-04    1.1801e-04       3.39823   0.00115392BOFIT Discussion Papers http://www.bof.fi/bofit
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